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1. Introduction
The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework has become a powerful tool to analyse monopolistic
competition and market structure in general equilibrium models, in particular in
(international) macroeconomics and trade theory. While the Dixit-Stiglitz model was
originally phrased in a static context, its importance is as least as large in a dynamic context.
In R&D based-models of economic growth, aggregate economic growth is explained from
the incentives private firms have to invest in research and development (R&D) [seminal
contributions are Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992)]. R&D generates blueprints for new product varieties, new production processes, or
improved product quality. Firms are only willing to invest in R&D if they can reap some
profits. The Dixit-Stiglitz framework has proved to be a most appealing and elegant way of
modelling the conditions under which firms can realise profits, which both provide the
incentives to innovate as well as the means to pay for the cost of innovation. The key
assumption in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework is that each firm produces a good that is
differentiated from other goods in the market. The elasticity of substitution in utility between
product varieties from different producers captures the degree of product differentiation.
This parameter determines the firm’s price elasticity and hence the degree of market power
it can exert.   Because  of  this  link  between  market conditions and investment incentives,
international differences in market conditions determine international differences in growth.
A central question in growth theory is what allows countries with relatively low income to
grow at a relatively high rate of growth so that they can catch up with the richer countries.
Under what conditions do income levels in rich and poor countries converge? How fast is
the speed of convergence?
In this paper it is studied how rates of convergence are affected by market conditions
as captured by firm’s market power. In particular, it is examined whether it becomes easier
or harder for poor countries to catch up with rich countries if the degree of product
differentiation among firms, and hence market power, is high. The key ingredient of the
Dixit-Stiglitz  framework is thus linked to the issue of convergence. The role product
differentiation plays turns out to depend on whether international capital mobility is assumed
or not. I explore the implications not only for the rate of convergence, but also for welfare.
It is shown that although a higher degree of substitution (and hence lower market power)
causes the rate of convergence to increase under capital mobility, it also implies a larger
welfare gap between rich and poor countries.
The model in this paper is a two-country model of endogenous growth based on in-
house R&D. There is a given number of firms. By spending on R&D, each of them invests
in firm-specific knowledge, which determines the their productivity level. The cost of R&D
depends on the firm-specific knowledge stock, as well as on national and international2
knowledge average knowledge stock. The latter two determinants capture intertemporal
knowledge spillovers and result in the familiar research externality, which makes firms
invest too little in R&D. The two countries considered differ only with respect to the initial
productivity level.
The main results are as follows. There is complete convergence in the long run if
there is no capital mobility. Under perfect capital mobility, countries converge to equal
long-run productivity levels, but permanent differences in consumption remain. The speed
of convergence is larger with perfect capital mobility than with balanced trade. The
difference increases with substitution between product varieties. Capital mobility harms
(benefits) the leader (lagging) country if domestic spillovers are more important than
international spillovers.
The topic of convergence has received a lot of attention in the growth literature. Two
strands stand out in this literature. The first strand focusses on growth driven by (human)
capital accumulation with one final good produced only and perfect competition. A
distinction should be made between closed and open economies. Closed economy models
predict convergence between rich and poor countries as long as there is diminishing returns
with respect to reproducible capital. Poor countries have low levels of capital and realize
high rate of return to investment so that they grow relatively fast (Barro and Sala-i-Martin
1995). If there is constant returns to capital, growth differentials are persistent and there is
no convergence (the AK-model, see Rebelo 1991). In the open economy setting,  capital is
assumed to be mobile. In the simplest version, convergence in productivity levels is
immediate since capital flows to the poor country that has accumulated less capital and
realizes a high (ex-ante) rate of return. However, this is at odds with empirical research that
finds a limited rate of convergence, of about 2 per cent only (Temple, 1999). The
introduction of adjustment costs or borrowing constraints makes the rate of convergence
limited again (see Turnovsky and Sen, 1995; Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin 1995). While
financial capital is internationally mobile, physical (and human) capital have to be
accumulated in the country where they are used. Investment in the domestic capital stock
takes time and is costly in terms of foregone consumption, even though borrowing from
abroad is possible. In the present paper, productive capital stocks (firm specific knowledge)
is home-grown, too, which explains why convergence takes time. 
The second strand of literature focusses on growth driven by R&D with monopolistic
competition and differentiated goods in the spirit of Dixit-Stiglitz. It is found that spillovers
of knowledge between countries are important for convergence. If there are no such
spillovers and if no inputs in production are traded, countries that start at different
productivity levels diverge (Grossman and Helpman, 1991 chapter 8; Fung and Ishikawa,
1992; Feenstra, 1996). With international spillovers, most analyses find that international
growth rates converge in the long run (Aghion and Howitt, 1998). In the literature both3
goods trade and international capital mobility are considered. However, so far it has not been
explored how convergence is affected by export demand conditions (as captured by the
export price elasticity, which is again related to the elasticity of substitution in the Dixit-
Stiglitz framework) and how it is affected by the international capital mobility. The present
paper aims at filling this gap. 
This chapter is also related to the literature on international interdependency in
international macroeconomics, both with respect to the type of models and the focus on how
welfare levels of countries are interrelated (see the survey by Lane 2001). While this
literature focusses on monetary shocks, this chapter focusses on productivity. It is
investigated how initial cross-country differences in productivity affect international capital
flows and welfare differences. The model can be interpreted as an analysis how a permanent
productivity shock in one country spill over to other countries, how international capital
mobility affects the propagation of the shock, and how endogenous R&D and international
knowledge spillovers affect the persistence of shocks over time.
The paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section
3, the model is reduced to two system of differential equations, one system for the model
with capital mobility, the other system for the model without capital mobility. It is shown
that the two countries converge in the long run. Section 4 studies how fast the countries
converge. Section 5 focusses on welfare. Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains proofs
of propositions. 
2. A two-country endogenous growth model 
2.1. Structure of the model
There are two countries that are characterized by identical preferences, technological
opportunities, and primary factor endowments. However, one country, indexed by
superscript A, starts at a more Advanced productivity level than country B (also referred to
as the Backward country). The central question is whether the two country converge in terms
of productivity levels, starting from this initial asymmetry, how fast they converge, and how
welfare in the two countries evolves over time. 
Each country has one primary factor of production in fixed supply (labour), which
is allocated over two activities, production and research. Produced goods are differentiated
and each variety is produced by a single monopolistic firm. These firms control and
accumulate firm-specific knowledge (as in Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995). Within
each country, there is a continuum of symmetric firms on the unit interval. This allows us
to save on notation by formulating the model for a single representative firm. All goods are     
1 In Van de Klundert and Smulders (2001), the implications of non-traded goods for
growth and convergence are considered). 
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traded in international markets at zero transport costs.
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The structural relationships are given in Table A. Countries are denoted by
superscript i = A, B (and if necessary also by superscript j for the other country). Each line
in the table represents two equations, one for each country. 
Labour productivity in production is denoted by h as appears from eqs. (A.1), relating
output  X to input L. Firms have an opportunity to increase labour productivity h by
performing R&D according to eqs. (A.2). Knowledge can be increased by allocating labour
(R) to R&D. Productivity in R&D depends on a fixed coefficient > and three sources of
knowledge (h
 i, 6 h
 i and 6 h
 j ). First, firms build upon specific knowledge accumulated in the
past. Second, all firms benefit from knowledge spillovers emanating from other firms in their
country. Third, there are knowledge spillovers from abroad. Knowledge spillovers relate to
the average level of knowledge in the different economies (6 h). Productivity levels may differ
across countries, but are identical across firms within a country. For this reason average
knowledge levels are equal to the knowledge levels of firms in each country ( 6 h
 i = h
 i ). 
Intertemporal preferences in the consumption index C are given in eqs. (A.3).
Infinitely-lived households apply a constant utility discount rate h. The relative rate of risk
aversion is denoted by D so that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution equals 1/D. The
consumption index (C) combines consumption of domestically produced varieties (D) and
imported varieties (M) by way of a CES sub-utility function, with an elasticity of substitution
denoted by g > 1, eqs. (A.4). 
Goods markets clear, see eqs. (A.5). The supply of labour is normalized at one and
equals total demand for labour, see eqs. (A.6). 5
Table A Structural relationships
Technology X





, g > 1 (A.4)
Market clearing X
 i = D




i = 1 (A.6)
Endogenous variables: Parameters:
X output "f foreign spillover parameter
h labour productivity "h domestic spillover parameter
L labour in production > research productivity parameter
R labour in research h utility discount rate
D consumption domestically produced 1/D elast. intertemporal substitution
goods g elast. intratemporal substitution
M imports
C aggregate consumption index
All equations apply to i, j = A, B and j…i.     
2 The maximization problem of firm k in country i can be represented by the following
Hamiltonian ,
where p
k(A) is the firm's demand function, see (B.2), X/h = L is labour employed in
production, see (A.1), the term in square brackets is firm-specific knowledge accumulation 0 h,
see (A.2), and ph is the co-state variable. The firm's instruments are X
k and R




2.2. Consumer and firm behaviour
The behavioural equations of our model are summarized in Table B. Consumers maximize
intertemporal utility over an infinite horizon. The decision problem consists of two stages
subject to the usual budget constraints. In the first stage, each consumer decides on the path
of aggregate consumption over time. This gives rise to the familiar Ramsey rule, shown in
eqs. (B.1). The growth rate of consumption equals the difference between the real
consumption rate of interest and the pure rate of time preference, multiplied by the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. In the second stage consumers split total per period
consumption spending over domestically produced varieties, eqs. (B.2) and foreign varieties,
eqs. (B.3). The price elasticity of demand is equal to g in all cases considered. Eqs. (B.4)
defines the price index of aggregate consumption. Since there are neither transport costs nor
international differences in preferences, this index is the same in both countries. By choosing
the composite consumption good as the numeraire, we can set the aggregate consumption
price equal to one.
Producers maximize the value of firm over an infinite horizon. Each firm faces a
downward sloped total demand function for its products as appears from eqs. (B.2) and
(B.3). Profit maximization implies that firms set a mark-up over (marginal) cost equal to
g/(g!1), as in eqs. (B.5). Labour demand for R&D follows from setting marginal revenue
(>Kph) equal to marginal cost (w), eqs. (B.6). The shadow price of firm-specific knowledge
ph is introduced as a Lagrangian multiplier in the maximization procedure.
2 Firms face a
trade-off with respect to investing in specific knowledge as appears from the arbitrage
conditions (B.7). These conditions say that investing an amount of money equal to ph in the
capital market (the RHS of B.7) should yield the same revenue as investing that same
amount of money in knowledge creation. The latter raises labour productivity in the
production sector and hence revenue in this sector (first term on the LHS of B.7), it raises
also the knowledge base in R&D (second term) and it yields a capital gain (last term).
Finally, eqs. (B.8) imply that domestic net savings are invested in net foreign assets
(A). Domestic savings are the sum of the trade balance (in parentheses) and interest receipts
on foreign assets. Under perfect capital mobility the rate of interest is uniform across
countries (r
A = r
B). At the other extreme there is the case of balanced trade or zero mobility
implying A = 0. Both regimes with respect to the balance of payments will be analysed.7









Balance of payments (B.8)
Asset market equilibrium (B.9)
Symbols
A net foreign assets pc price index consumption
r nominal interest rate p output price
w wage rate ph firm's shadow price of knowledge
All equations apply to i, j = A, B and j…i.     
3We restrict the analysis to interior solutions with g > 0, which requires sufficiently high
productivity in research, > > h. If > # h, no growth occurs in the steady state. Outside the
steady state, some convergence in productivity levels will take place if the two country start




Table C reduces the model to five key equations. In deriving the equations, it is taken into
account that all firms within a country have the same productivity level,  h
i=6 h
i. The growth
rates of h and C are denotes by g and gC respectively; a = A/h denotes net foreign assets
relative to productivity.
Equation (C.1), which is derived from (B.1) and (B.4), restates the Ramsey rule. It
represents the relationship between consumption growth and the required rate of return on
households’ savings. Equation (C.2) combines (B.6) and (B.7). The equation represents the
rate of return that firms can maximally pay to households. Equation (C.3) represents labour
market equilibrium. It states that the amount of labour not allocated to production, results
into productivity growth. The productivity in research depends on the knowledge gap h
i/h
j.
A low stock of knowledge relative to the other country induces large spillovers and allows
the country to grow faster at a given amount of labour allocated to research. Balance of
payments equilibrium is represented by equation (C.4) which combines (A.1) and (B.8).
Goods market equilibrium is given by (C.5) which combines (A.1), (A.5) and (B.2)-(B.3).
Since preferences are homothetic and prices are the same in both countries, the ratio of
consumption of goods produced by A relative to those produced by B is the same in both
countries and equals the ratio of A’s output relative to B’s output.
If the two countries are completely symmetric -- that is, if they have equal
productivity levels (h
A = h
B), the same allocation of labour, and no foreign assets nor debt (a
= 0) -- a balanced growth path arises. On the balanced growth path, consumption and output
grow at a common growth rate which is endogenous and given by:
3
, i = A, B (1)
As usual, growth falls with discount rates, risk aversion, and spillover parameters, but
increases with the productivity of R&D. For future use, it is also useful to note that in the
steady state we have:
(2)
(3)     
4 The solutions for country variables (# x
 i) follow from combining # x
 R and # x
 S. For instance,
, and similar for all other stationary variables. For the predetermined
knowledge levels, the following holds: ;  .
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To analyse the dynamics of the model, we log-linearize around the symmetric steady
state in which both countries are identical. Linearized variables are denoted by tildes, # x/
dlnx = dx/x. We solve for relative variables, that is, ratios of country A’s to country B’s
variables, denoted by superscipt R, # x
R  /  # x
A  !  # x
B  = d(x
A/x
B). Hence tilded variables
superscripted R describe how the variable in country A deviates from that in country B. The
only exception is variable # a which relates to absolute difference from the steady state, # a/da.
We make this exception because in the symmetric equilibrium a = A/h = 0. Table D directly
follows from straightforward linearization of the relations in Table C.
In a similar way, the model can be solved for country summations (# x
S / # x
A+# x
B for any
variable x), which allows us to analyse the dynamics of the “integrated world economy”.
Before doing so, the model has to be rewritten model in terms of stationary variables. In
particular, we first rewrite the model in Table C such that C/h shows up as a single variable,
instead of C and h as separate variables. The model in stationary variables for the integrated
economy then has a very simple reduced form:
(4)
This single differential equation in   applies both under perfect capital
mobility and under balanced trade. The differential equation is unstable, so that   jumps
immediately to the steady state. The allocation of labour in the integrated world economy
remains unchanged over the entire transition (  œt). It implies that all stationary
variables in the integrated economy are time-invariant. Hence, # g
S = 0, so that the knowledge stock
of the integrated world economy does not change over time and the summation of knowledge
levels must be equal to the summation of the initial deviations from the symmetrical steady state
level:   œt.
4 Also the stationary variable C/h is time-invariant in the integrated world




The integrated world economy behaves as a closed economy on a balanced growth
path, irrespective of the level of the world knowledge stock and its distribution of over the
two countries. How the two countries behave separately depends on whether there is
international capital mobility or not and is analysed in the next section.
Table C Key relationships
Ramsey rule (C.1)
Investment decision (C.2)
Labour market equilibrium (C.3)
Balance of payments (C.4)
Goods market equilibrium (C.5)
Notation:    consumption growth;    productivity growth; a / A/h  net foreign
assets, scaled by knowledge stock. In all equations j = A, B; i = A, B and j … i.
Table D Linearized model: country differences
Ramsey rule (D.1)
Investment decision (D.2)
Labour market equilibrium (D.3)
Balance of payments (D.4)
Goods market equilibrium (D.5)     
5 The determinant equals
.
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3. Balanced trade versus capital mobility
From table D, a two-dimensional phase diagram can be derived to find the rate of
convergence in productivity. This will be done separately for the regime of perfect capital
mobility and that of balanced trade.
3.1 Balanced Trade
In the absence of international capital markets, total production equals total consumption in
each country and net foreign assets positions are zero, # a = 0. From (D.4) and (D.5), national
production and consumption are directly linked according to:
(7)
The reduced-form model in relative variables can be compressed to a system of two
differential equation in # h
R and # L





The determinant of the matrix in (8) is negative.
5 Therefore, the system of differential
equations is saddle-point stable. The corresponding phase diagram is drawn in Figure 1. As
appears from eqs. (8) the   locus slopes downward. The figure depicts a upward
sloping   locus, which applies under realistic parameter assumptions (e.g. D > 1 and
"h > "f). The stable arm of the saddle path is indicated by the broken line. Its slope is
unambiguously positive. Unequal productivity levels give rise to transitional dynamics. For
any  , the system moves along to the stable arm and converges to a symmetric     
6 It may seem unrealistic that the poor country undertakes more R&D than the rich
country. Note, however, that R&D in the model should more broadly interpreted than merely
patent development. It encompasses all activities that firms undertake to improve productivity
and quality, including for example imitation and reverse engineering.
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equilibrium in the long run. Suppose   so that country B lags behind A. During the
process of convergence, the leading economy employs more labour in production than the
lagging country. The lagging country allocates relatively more labour to R&D, which boosts
growth.
6 In the long run there is complete catching up,  , and each country’s
productivity expands at the same rate, given by (1).
Insert Figure 1
By standard procedures, we can find analytical solutions for the linearized model. Let
8BT be the absolute value of the negative root of the matrix in (8). This parameter is the




Consumption follows from (7) and (12):
(13)
3.2. Capital mobility
With perfect capital mobility, rates of return are equalized, # r
 R = 0. Equation (D.1) reveals
that relative consumption levels are constant over time. Formally, relative consumption
follows from integration of (D.1), which gives:
, (14)
where # v is the constant of integration, which can be solved from the initial conditions of the     
7 Saddlepoint stability again applies, since the determinant equals
.
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dynamic model. From table D, with (D.1) replaced by (14), the model can be reduced to the






Since both assets and goods are perfectly mobile internationally, allocation of production
over the two countries can be separated from the allocation of wealth and consumption. The
system in (16) represents the allocation of production, which can be solved for independently
from (15), which represents the allocation of consumption. Note that the structure of (16)
is similar to the case of balanced trade, see (8). This gives rise to a similar phase diagram
and a similar time pattern for relative productivity and labour allocation.
7  Also (12) and (13)
apply after replacing 8BT by 8CM,, where 8CM be the absolute value of the negative root of the
matrix in (16), which is the adjustment speed that governs the dynamics of all variables in
the case of capital mobility. 
To solve for relative consumption, we use (15) and the boundary values. Substituting
the long run results for L and h into (15) we can solve for the long-run asset position:
(19)
Since assets are predetermined, we have:
(20)
Since 8CM represents the adjustment speed of the economy,  we may write the change of any
variable as proportional to the gap between its current value and its long run value. For
assets we thus have:14
(21)
Substituting the last three results into (15) for t = 0, we find:
(22)
Relative consumption at all t > 0 follows from (14), (22) and (11):
(23)
3.3. Consumption and productivity over time
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of consumption and productivity when country A starts at a
productivity level ahead that of country B ( ). Without capital mobility, the advanced
country consumes more than the lagging one, but consumption levels converge over time.
Also with capital mobility, the advanced country consumes more than the lagging one, but
now this is a permanent situation. Country A maintains higher levels of consumption than
country B despite the fact that productivity levels converge. The reason is that country A
accumulates foreign assets. Country B uses growing export revenues to service its foreign
debt. Note that capital mobility allows both countries to smooth consumption over time.
Insert Figure 2 
4. How does monopolistic competition affect convergence?
To examine how quickly productivity levels in the two countries converge, we study the
properties of the stable roots of the planar system in (8) and (16), which capture the
dynamics under balanced trade and capital mobility respectively. These roots can be written
as 
 > 0,  (24)     
8 We also find 8CM = 8BT if g = 1. This is however a degenerate case since the monopoly
price is no longer defined. A unitary price elasticity makes the monopolist’s revenues
independent of  productivity levels which removes any incentive to innovation.
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where Tk and Dk < 0 be the trace and determinant, respectively, of the system in (8) for k =
BT (and of that in (16) for k = CM). From this expression we can derive the following
(proofs are in the appendix):
Proposition #1: If D $ 1, the speed of adjustment (rate of convergence) is
faster with capital mobility than with balanced trade.
Remark: In all numerical experiments I tried, I found the same result for 0 < D < 1.
Consumers prefer to smooth consumption. Capital mobility allows a country that is
lagging behind to close the productivity gap at higher speed without restraining consumption
a lot, by running current account deficits. The lagging country closes the gap with the
leading country, since it realizes (ex ante) a higher rate of return and invests more than the
leading country. If capital is not mobile internationally, investments have to be financed
fully by domestic savings, which is costly for domestic consumers who want to smooth
consumption. In this case, the supply of savings is less elastic, which slows down the process
of catching up relative to the case in which foreign supply of capital finances catching up.
The adjustment speed with capital mobility equals that without capital mobility only
if D = 0 (since then the matrices in (8) and (16) are identical).
8 In this extreme case, utility
is linear in consumption and consumption smoothing no longer plays a role. Supply of
savings is perfectly elastic, independent of whether capital mobility applies or not.
The following proposition states how convergence rates change with the elasticity
of substitution g, which can be considered as the monopolistic competition parameter:
Proposition #2: With capital mobility, the rate of convergence increases in g.
Without capital mobility, the rate of convergence decreases (increases) in g
if D > 1 (D < 1). 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. A larger price elasticity (g) implies a smaller
terms of trade loss from an increase in national output. Hence, the larger the price elasticity,
the larger the future gains in terms of export revenues can be reaped by the lagging country
when it gradually closes its productivity gap with its trading partner. In other words, a higher
price elasticity implies a higher (ex ante) rate of return for a given productivity gap. With
capital mobility, higher rates of return attract more foreign capital and thus speed up16
convergence. Without capital mobility, a higher rate of return has ambiguous effects on
investment since income and substitution effects work in opposite directions. In this case,
domestic investment equals domestic savings so that domestic income and substitution
effects determine investment. If D > 1, the intertemporal rate of substitution is low and a rise
in the rate of return makes consumers to save less, which slows down accumulation and
convergence. In the opposite case of high intertemporal substitution, consumers start saving
more and speed up convergence.
Table E Calibration and sensitivity analysis
gD h " f "h g
(5) (5/3) (0.025) (0.15) (0.4) (0.018)
8CM 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.1 !0.4 0.6
(3.4%)
8BT !0.1 !0.2 0.4 1.0 !0.1 0.6
(1.0%)
0.2 0.1 0.1 !0.1 !0.0 !0.1
(0.67)
0.7 !0.3 !0.6 !0.3 1.1 0.6
(!0.01)
Values in parentheses: benchmark parameters and results.
Numbers in table: elasticities evaluated at benchmark parameter set.
Table E presents a calibration exercise and sensitivity analysis. The top row presents
the benchmark set of parameters. There are six degrees of freedom which I use to calibrate
the model to generally accepted outcomes. I fix the growth rate g on its postwar US average.
In every numerical experiment, I adjust productivity parameter > according to (1) to ensure
the selected growth rate. Time preference h and intertemporal substitution 1/D are not far
from accepted views. The price elasticity g is chosen such that a reasonable profit margin
1/(g!1) of 25 percent results, which is consistent with a broad range of studies (Obstfeld and     
9Note that g both represents substitution among domestically produced varieties and
substitution between home and foreign goods. Empirically, these elasticities differ
considerably: export elasticities are considerably below 5. The current model can be easily
adapted to separate aggregate export demand elasticities from firm’s elasticities of demand,
by adding an additional level of nesting in A.4). If we would denote the latter by 0 and the
former still by g, only (B.5) and (B.7) would change (g has to be replaced by 0 in these
equations) and all other equations remain the same. Hence, g should be interpreted as the
elasticity of export demand. If we choose g = 2 and leave other parameters in Table E
unchanged, we find 8CM = 2.1%, 8BT = 1.1%,  = 0.43,  = !0.003; the
elasticities with respect to g become significantly larger, but other elasticities remain similar
to those in Table E.
     
10Recently, however, doubts have started to arise about the robustness of this number. In
his survey on the econometrics of convergence, Temple (1999, p. 134) reports that more
sophisticated studies find estimates that range between zero and 30 per cent a year.
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Rogoff, 2000).
9 The benchmark parameters give adjustment speeds under the two alternative
regimes that are close to the famous two percent, found in almost all empirical studies (see
Sala-i-Martin 1996).
10 I report the results for adjustment speeds in parentheses in the first
column, top rows. The other columns of the Table display elasticities for the adjustment
speeds evaluated at the benchmark parameter set, with respect to each of the six parameters,
holding fixed the other five parameters. 
It turns out that the rates of convergence under the alternative regimes differ
substantially. Also, we see that the rate of convergence under capital mobility is most
sensitive to the growth rate and the foreign spillover parameter. The adjustment speed under
balanced trade is fairly robust to changes in parameters. 
5. Welfare
Rather than cross-country differences in consumption, as indicated by C
R and discussed
above,  cross-country differences in welfare are relevant to assess the impact of capital
mobility and convergence. In this section it is discussed how much welfare between a
lagging and leading country differs and how capital mobility affects this difference.
5.1. Welfare calculus
Intertemporal welfare of the representative consumer in a country depends on the entire path
of consumption, see (A.3). Because of this and because in the absence of unexpected shocks
consumption is continuous, a change in welfare can be decomposed in a level effect -- the
change in initial consumption -- and a growth effect -- the change in the growth rate of
consumption over time. Linearizing the intertemporal welfare function (A.3), we find the     





where 8 is the relevant rate of convergence. The first term is the level effect, the bracketed
term is the growth effect. The latter is a weigthed average of the short-run change in growth
( ) and its long-run change ( ). The larger the adjustment speed 8, the larger is the weight
on the long-run change, since long-run values are approached faster. Note that the change in
welfare in (51) is scaled in such a way that the expression can be interpreted as the equivalent
change in permanent consumption, that is the permanent increase in consumption on a balanced
growth path that generates an equivalent change in welfare. 
Taking country differences and substituting  , we may write
for the change in country A’s welfare relative to country B’s welfare:
(26)
Substituting the solutions for C
R, from (13) and (23), and steady state relations, (2) and (3), we
find for the two regimes:
(27)
where k = BT,CM denotes the capital market regime.
5.2. Cross-country welfare differences 
The expression in (27) gives the relative consumption differential on the balanced growth path
that is equivalent to the differences in welfare stemming from the fact that country B starts at a
productivity level that is   below that of country A. With capital mobility, the expression
equals the actual consumption difference, since consumption differentials are permanent and
consumption grows at the balanced growth rate. Without capital mobility, the expression is
a fraction of the actual short-run consumption differential, since relative consumption levels19
converge in the long run. Nevertheless, the equivalent consumption differential can be
written both with and without capital mobility as in (27), which facilitates the comparison
between the two regimes.
Equation (27) reveals some interesting properties of welfare differentials between
converging countries: 
Proposition #3: Welfare of the lagging country is below that of the leading
country. The welfare differential increases with g if   is sufficiently
small.
Proof: The first term in parentheses in (27) increases in g. By proposition 2,
8 in the second term in parentheses changes with g, but this effect never
dominates if   is sufficiently small.
Remark: In numerical experiments I only could identify parameter values for
which the welfare differential increases with the price elasticity.  
Not surprisingly, we find that the country that lags in terms of productivity has lower
intertemporal welfare than the leading country. A strong position in international markets,
as measured by a low value of the price elasticity g, mitigates the welfare differences. In
other words, market power insulates a country against adverse productivity shocks. The
reason is that strongly favourable terms of trade effects counterbalance the negative income
effects. This effect would also apply in a static economy (with g = 0), in which the welfare
differential would be simply (g!1)/g times the productivity difference. The fact that the
second term in parentheses is smaller than unity reveals that the process of catching up
associated with spillovers and growth reduces the welfare gap below the level that would
apply in the static economy. 
In Table E some numerical results are presented. It turns out that for the benchmark
parameter set a 1 per cent productivity gap causes intertemporal welfare of the lagging
country to be 0.67 per cent below that of the leading country, measured in terms of
permanent consumption. This number is rather insensitive to any of the parameters.
5.3. The gains from capital mobility
We now turn to the gains from capital mobility. A country benefits from capital mobility if
its welfare is higher with capital mobility than without. We have to calculate the differences
in welfare for each country under the alternative regimes. We can infer these values from
the relative variables. Recall that total consumption in the world economy does not depend     
12 This result also echos some results from the static literature on capital mobility (see
Wong 1995). If the number of traded goods equals the number of factors and production
functions are the same in both countries, then, starting from free goods trade, opening up to
international capital markets does not affect welfare since factor prices are already equalised
by goods trade. In our model, the issue is also whether capital mobility affects welfare, but in
a dynamic setting with intrasectoral (rather than intersectoral) trade. Without capital mobility,
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on the international capital market regime, see (5)-(6). Therefore, the gains from capital
mobility stem only from the change in allocation of consumption over the two countries
when moving from balanced trade to capital mobility. In particular, the gain from capital
mobility for country A is half of the difference between  evaluated for capital mobility
and  evaluated for balanced trade. Country B’s gain is the same number with opposite
sign (see section 3.2). From (27) we find:
(28)
The expression in (28) gives the welfare premium of capital mobility (in terms of permanent
consumption) for country A. It reveals the winners and losers from international capital
mobility as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition #4: The leading country is worse off with capital mobility and the
lagging country gains from capital mobility if spillovers within the country
are more important than spillovers between countries ("h > "f).
Proof: the sign of the expression in (28) depends on the sign of  .
Numerical results are again presented in Table E. The welfare premium of capital mobility
for the country that lags 1 per cent behind amounts to about 0.01 per cent of consumption.
This number turns out to be relatively sensitive to the growth rate and domestic spillovers.
It might come as a surprise that the introduction of capital mobility does not improve
welfare for both countries. One might expect capital mobility to be welfare improving as it
opens the possibility of consumption smoothing. However, this effect is of second order in
the linear approximations around a symmetrical steady state.
12 What causes gains and lossesfactor prices (wages and rates of return) are equalised only in the long-run. Production
functions (for goods and knowledge) are the same.
     
13 This independency allows us to focus on the role of export demand elasticities. In the
chapter by Smulders and Van de Klundert in this book it is explained that this property arises
because the number of firms is fixed.
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from capital mobility is the impact of knowledge spillovers in both countries. These
spillovers create externalities in research and leads to suboptimal investment decisions, since
the market for public knowledge is missing. Domestic knowledge spillovers imply
underinvestment from a welfare point of view. Under capital mobility, productivity in the
leading country grows more slowly than under balanced trade and in the lagging country it
grows faster, since capital flows to the lagging country. Therefore, capital mobility mitigates
the underinvestment effect in the lagging country  but aggravates it in leading country.
Cross-country spillovers have an opposite effect. The returns to innovation undertaken by
one country accrue partly to its trading partner, thereby deteriorating its competitive position.
Hence, foreign spillovers result in overinvestment from the point of national welfare. Capital
mobility aggravates overinvestment in country one. The proposition states that if the national
externality is more severe than the international externality, there is on balance
underinvestment in each country. Since capital mobility speeds up investment in the lagging
country, it is this country that gains from capital mobility.
6. Conclusions
In the two-country growth model in this chapter, initial productivity differences between
countries are ultimately eliminated since the lagging country grows faster. In the long run,
international growth rates fully converge. The long-run growth rate does not depend on the
degree of monopolistic competition, as measured by the inverse of the elasticity of
substitution between product varieties.
13 However, since elasticity of substitution between
product varieties shapes competition between home and foreign producers, it affects the
incentives to invest in home relative to foreign firms. Hence, monopolistic competition is
a key determinant of the speed of convergence. With low intertemporal substitution (1/D <
1), we have found that lower monopoly profits speed up convergence under capital mobility
but reduce the convergence speed in the absence of capital mobility. For a given degree of
monopolistic competition, capital mobility allows for faster convergence, but it improves
welfare only in the receiving country if domestic knowledge spillovers are larger than
international knowledge spillovers. Externalities in research and development make the
leading country worse off international capital flows. It remains to be seen how the results22
change when national governments subsidize R&D to correct these externalities, and how
the result change in the case of coordinated R&D policies. This is left for future research.
References
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt 1992, `A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction',
Econometrica, 60, pp. 323-352.
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt 1998, Endogenous growth theory, MIT press.
Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin 1995, Economic Growth, NewYork: McGraw-Hill.
Barro, R.J., N.G. Mankiw and X. Sala-i-Martin 1995, `Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models
of Growth', American Economic Review 85, 103-115.
Dixit, A.K. and J.E. Stiglitz 1977, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity,
American Economic Review 67, pp. 297-308.
Feenstra, R. 1996, Trade and Uneven Growth, Journal of Development Economics 49, 229-256.
Fung, K-Y, and J. Ishikawa 1992, “Dynamic increasing returns, technology and economic growth
in a small open economy”, Journal of Development Economics 37, 63-87.
Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman 1991, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, MIT
Press, Cambridge MA. 
Klundert, Th. van de, and S. Smulders, 2001 “Loss of Technological Leadership of Rentier
Economies, a two-country endogenous growth model”, Journal of international
Economics 54, 211-231.
Lane, Ph. 2001, “The New Open Economy Macroeconomics: a Survey”, Journal of International
Economics 54, 235-266.
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff, 2000, “The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics:
Is There a Common Cause?” NBER working paper 7777.
Rebelo, S. 1991, “Long-run Policy Analysis and Long-run Growth”, Journal of Polictical
Economy 99, 500-521.
Romer, P.M. 1990, `Endogenous Technological Change', Journal of Political Economy, 98,
s71-s102.
Sala-i-Martin, X. 1996 “The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis”, Economic Journal
106, 1019-36.
Smulders, S. 1994 Growth, Market Structure and The Environment; essays on the theory of
endogenous economic growth, PhD thesis Tilburg University.
Smulders, S. and Th. van de Klundert 1995, `Imperfect Competition, Concentration and Growth
with Firm-specific R&D', European Economic Review 39, pp. 139-160.
Temple, J. 1999 “The New Growth Evidence”, Journal of Economic Literature 37, 112-156.
Turnovsky, S.J. and P. Sen, 1995, `Investment in a Two-Sector Dependent Economy', Journal23
of the Japanese and International Economies 9, 29-55.
Wong, K-Y 1995 International Trade in Goods and Factor Mobility, Cambridge MA: MIT
press.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2 
Total differentiation of (24) gives  . Differentiating with
respect to g, we find:
 and
. 
•I f   "h < "f, it follows immediately that  and  .
•I f   "h > "f,  if and only if  . This latter inequality
always holds, since using the expression of 8CM above, we find (i) 8CM = 0 if g = 0,
(ii)  , and (iii) 8CM is a continuous function of g. 
•I f   "h > "f and D > 1,  if and only if  . This latter
inequality holds, since (i) from (8) and (16), it follows that 8CM = 8BT if g = 1 and (ii)
we have already proved that   . Hence, 8BT < 8CM for all g > 1
and D >1. 
•I f   "h > "f and D < 1,  if and only if  . This latter
inequality holds for all g > 1, since (i) 8BT =   if g = 1 and (ii) 8BT
is a continuous function of g.
Proof of proposition 1 
If g = 1, 8CM =  8BT. From proposition 2 we conclude that for D > 1, 8CM increases with g and
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Figure 2 Log Productivity and Log Consumption over time 
(solid lines: capital mobility; broken lines: balanced trade) 
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